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This article aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the theoretical research on
multi-unit auctions to help identify the gap in this literature. Multi-unit auctions have
been extensively used in practise and account for significant amount of transactions
in some real-world markets. However, the theoretical research on these auctions has
attract less attention compared to single unit auctions. The focus of this article is on
those research that study multi-unit auctions for the sale of multiple units of homo-
geneous objects to potential buyers with more than one unit demand. The articles are
categorized based on the assumptions of their models regarding bidders’ values and
the type of auction. Further the gap in this literature is identified with those areas that
require further theoretical research.
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1 Introductions
Multi-unit auctions or multiple object auctions refer to those auctions where multiple
units are available for sale in a single auction. They are commonly used in many real-world
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markets to sell variety of goods such as treasury bills, emissions permits, electricity and
spectrum licenses. The common feature of these markets is that there are multiple units
of a homogeneous good available for sale to a group of potential buyers. Buyers usually
demand multiple units and therefore submit a schedule of bids in the auction. Despite the
massive use of these auctions in real-world markets, they are significantly understudied
compared to single-unit auctions. This is the first article that specifically considers the
theoretical work on multi-unit auctions and provide a survey of the theoretical literature
related to these auctions.1 The aim is to identify the gap in this literature and to recognise
those areas that require further theoretical analysis.
Single unit auctions are well understood and surveyed (Klemperer, 1999; Krishna,
2009). For instance, two preliminary studies are Vickrey (1961) and Milgrom and Weber
(1982) where authors provide results regarding to the comparison of efficiency and rev-
enue of standard single-unit auctions. Unlike single-unit auctions where bidders compete
through price bids, in multi-unit auctions bidders compete in both price and quantities
which greatly increases the bidders’ strategy space. Therefore, as Vickrey (1961) suggests
most of the results for single-unit auctions are not extendible to the case with multi units.
As a result, the strategic nature of bidding in multi-unit auctions is still an area of active re-
search. To date, the literature suggests ambiguous theoretical results and mixed empirical
results regarding the comparison of efficiency and revenue ranking of famous multi-unit
auction formats. Therefore, there is no strong revenue equivalence theorem for multi-unit
auctions. Also, there is no clear revenue and efficiency rankings of auction formats.
This paper is a survey of the current theoretical literature on multi-unit auctions with
homogeneous goods. Section 1 gives an overview of the components of multi-unit auc-
tions, Section 2 describes examines common value auctions and Section 3 examines pri-
vate value models.
2 Overview of multi-unit auctions
This section identifies the fundamental components of auction models and describes
the different assumptions used in multi-unit auction literature. Theoretical papers define
a stylised model of an auction in either discrete or continuous space, and establish Nash
or Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for bidding behaviour. The final allocation of goods and
the bidder payments are of interest in determining the auction’s allocative and revenue
efficiency. Multi-unit auctions have the following characteristics:
1. A seller offers multiple units of a good to a number of bidders.
1Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2013) survey the experimental research on multi-unit auctions.
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2. Bidders have a vector of valuations for the units.
3. Bidders submit bids for the units they demand.
4. Based on an allocation rule the units are allocated among bidders.
5. The payment rule determines the payment of each buyers.
2.1 Items for sale
The good for sale can be either an infinitely divisible quantity of a good, or an integer
number of units of an indivisible good. The former lends itself to analysis in continuous
space whereas the latter is discrete. In the majority of papers the quantity of the good is
fixed and known (Krishna, 2009), however, some papers examine the case where supply
is uncertain. Supply uncertainty can be exogenous, as is the case when a random non-
competitive bid wins some units with certainty (Kremer and Nyborg, 2004b; Wang and
Zender, 2002). In this instance, bidders consider the supply to be random but with a known
distribution. Supply can be determined endogenous when the seller strategically chooses
quantity offered to increase revenue. The seller may choose the supply after observing
the bids (Back and Zender 2001) or pre-commit to a known supply curve prior to bidding
(Khezr and MacKenzie, 2018b; LiCalzia and Pavan, 2005). In either case, the seller’s
behaviour is taken into account by the bidders when constructing their bidding strategies.
2.2 Valuations
Auctions are commonly used when a seller is uncertain about the value of goods. Bid-
ders may have a common value, private values or a combination of common and private
values. Also it is possible that the values of bidders are affiliated as described in, Milgrom
and Weber (1982). Furthermore, the bidders’ certainty of the value may vary based on
the known distribution of the value of the item and/or whether they have received a signal
indicating the item’s value. Thus, bidders may have common knowledge and play a game
of complete information, or have private knowledge and play a game of incomplete infor-
mation. In this paper we study the multi-unit auction literature on common value models
in Section 3 and then investigate private value models in Section 4.
In common value auctions, the good has the same value to all bidders and it is usual to
assume constant marginal valuations for all units. Examples of common value goods are
treasury bills that can be traded in a liquid secondary market. When bidders do not know
the value of the good but receive a signal related to the actual common value the good is
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a ‘risky assets’ and bidders form an expectation for the value of the goods. When bidders
receive the same signal they are symmetrically informed and form the same expected value
for the goods. If they receive different signals they are asymmetrically informed and form
a conditional expectation for the value of the good.
In a single unit auction, winners’ curse reflects the fact that a bidder’s expected value
of the item, conditional on winning, is less than the unconditional expected value. In the
multi-unit case the generalised winners’ curse takes into account that winning more units
reveals even worse news about the true value of the object. For instance, as Ausubel et al.
(2014) show, bidders behave strategically and shade their bids to avoid winners’ curse.
In private value auctions, the value a bidder assigns to the items is bidder’s private
information. Unlike the complete information case where bidders know each others’ val-
uations, in incomplete information case, bidders only know the distribution of the other
valuations but do not know the realisations. Bidders may be symmetric or asymmetric.
In asymmetric auctions, the distribution of bidders’ values are asymmetric and one may
stochastically dominate the others Baisa and Burkett (2018). Bidders may have constant
or diminishing marginal valuations for the items are usually capacity constrained.
Some papers consider circumstances when items may be substitutes or complements
and where some bidders prefer specific units, or value combinations differently from their
parts (McMillan, 1994). This is relevant when goods are similar but heterogeneous such as
spectrum licenses. Heterogeneous items can be auctioned using combination auctions (or
menu auctions) where bidders submit different bids for different combinations of items
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). These types of auctions are beyond the scope of this
paper, which focuses on homogeneous goods for which valuations are weakly diminishing.
2.3 Bidding
One common way of bidding in multi-unit auctions is the static bid or the seald-bid.
In static auctions, bidders submit their bids once without knowing other bids. However, in
dynamic auctions, there are multiple rounds of bidding and bidders revise their information
in each round to reflect the bidding history. In static auctions, most models assume bidders
submit a demand function across all or a fraction of the units, however, some models
impose a quantity or tick restrictions on submitted bids (Kastl, 2011; Kremer and Nyborg,
2004a,b). In some cases a continuum of equilibrium outcomes are possible and a common
approach in the literature is to identify the Pareto dominant equilibrium from the bidders
perspective Back and Zender (1993).
In dynamic multi-unit auctions such as open ascending auctions the common way to
model is to incrementally raise the auction price whilst bidders indicate the quantity they
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demand. When the aggregate demanded is equal to the supply the auction stops. Concep-
tually, a descending price auction is possible, but not explored in the literature. Multiple
simultaneous single-unit English auctions are another form of dynamic multi-unit auc-
tions. One of the advantages of dynamic auctions is the case where buyers have common
values. The dynamic bidding would allow bidders to revise their valuations and reduces
the risk of winners curse Ausubel and Cramton (2004).
2.4 Allocation rule
All conventional multi-unit auctions allocate units to bidders who submit the highest
bids. In the case of infinitely divisible goods and continuous demand schedules. In the
case where the aggregate demand is flat at the point of total supply of units there may be
excess demand and a rationing rule is required to ration the units at margin. Most papers
ration the marginal units using pro-rata or random allocation. If there are a large number
of units, such as in models of treasury bills, then a pro-rata allocation of marginal units
amongst marginal bids is often used (Back and Zender, 1993; Kastl, 2011; LiCalzia and
Pavan, 2005). When there are a smaller number of units, a random allocation rule is more
common (Bresky, 2013; Noussair, 1995). Rationing is not only applied to marginal units,
for instance, Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) introduces the rationing rule where the total
supply is allocated pro-rata amongst all winning bids.
2.5 Payment rule
In the multi-unit auction literature, the three most most common payment rules are
the uniform-price, the discriminatory price and the Vickrey. The uniform-price auction,
first introduced by Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1960), is the auction that utilise a uniform
payment for all bidders. Most uniform-price auctions use the first rejected bid (the highest
losing bid) as the market-clearing price, however, the last accepted bid (or the lowest
winning bid) is also used (Burkett and Woodward, 2020).
The discriminatory price auction, also known as, pay-as-bid auction utilises a similar
payment rule to the first-price auction for single units. This auction was initially used to
sell treasury bills in the US during mid 1970s (Back and Zender, 1993). In the discrimi-
natory auction each winning bidder pays their own bids for each unit won. The two most
commonly used payment rules in practice are the uniform payment rule and discrimina-
tory payment rule. The Vickrey payment rule is rarely used in practice but is a useful
theoretical benchmark. Papers that compare the equilibria of the three payment rules often
compare them on grounds of revenue and efficiency. The Vickrey payment rule requires
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bidders to pay the social opportunity cost of the units they purchase. This amount is cal-
culated as the sum of highest losing bids placed by competing bidders (Krishna, 2009).
One of the important properties of the Vickrey payment rule is that bidders’ payments are
independent of their bids. Thus it results in truthful bidding and efficient allocation of
units.
There are other payment rules except the ones mentioned above. For instance, Ausubel
and Cramton (2004) suggests a dynamic auction with a payment rule equivalent to the
Vickrey auction that is efficient and induces truthful bidding. We further explain this
payment rule in Section 5.
3 Common values
In common value auctions, all bidders have the same value for the units. They may
know the value with certainty or they may receive a private or common signal of the actual
value. All allocations of common goods are efficient, however, different auctions can have
very different expected revenues. This section first assesses how allocation and payment
rules affect bidders’ strategies and resulting equilibira. It then examines how alternations
to the auction design can eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform-price auctions.
3.1 Uniform-price auction with common values
In the uniform-price auction, all bidders pay the same price for the units sold. In a
sealed-bid uniform-price auction, bidders submit a demand schedule specifying the quan-
tity demanded at each price. The demand schedules are aggregated and the price at which
demand equals supply is the market price. Bidders know that the price is determined by
the marginal bid, and they face a trade off between bidding higher to increase the chance
to win more units and paying more for inframarginal units. In equilibrium, bidders face a
residual supply curve and behave like monopsonists. They underbid on subsequent units
to lower the price. Alternative terms used in the literature to describe the underbidding on
subsequent units are bid shading and demand reduction (Wilson, 1979; Back and Zender,
1993).
Wilson (1979) was the first study to consider low revenue equilibria in the uniform-
price auction. The model consisted of a perfectly divisible unit being auctioned to a fixed
and known number of bidders who submit a sealed schedule of prices they were willing to
pay for different sized shares of the unit. The paper finds that when bidders are risk-neutral
and symmetric, there are equilibria in which the multi-unit auction (the share auction)
results in significantly lower prices compared to a case where the whole share is sold
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in a unit-auction. This is the first evidence of bid shading and demand reduction in the
uniform-price auction.
Back and Zender (1993) extendedWilson (1979) by allowing discontinuous bid sched-
ules and found that uniform-price auctions can support equilibria such that the seller is
indifferent to a case where all units are sold at a price equal to the reserve price. In the
set of equilibria they suggest, each bidder submits a demand schedule such that the de-
mand is equal to zero at prices above a threshold, downward sloping at price lower than
that threshold but above the expected clearing price, and flat for prices below the clearing
price. The demand schedules are such that no bidder has an individual incentive to devi-
ate from the bidding strategy. Because winning additional units means raising the price
of all the units and the marginal increase in price outweighs the marginal benefits. Also
there is no incentives to win less items in order to reduce the total price given the slope of
the demand schedules. Back and Zender (1993) show that all market prices between the
reserve price and the common value are supportable as an equilibrium clearing price, but
the lowest price, that is, the reserve price is the Pareto optimal outcome from the bidders’
perspective. Therefore, the seller is indifferent to a case where all units are sold at a fixed
price equal to the reserve price.
3.2 Discriminatory price auctions with common values
Milgrom and Weber (1982) study the equilibrium bidding of the first-price auction for
a single unit. As suggested by Bukhchandani and Huang (1989) a similar characterization
is applicable to the multi-unit discriminatory auction with common values. Back and
Zender (1993) also study a discriminatory auction with common values. They suggest it is
intuitive or rather obvious that bidders bid flatter demands than their actual demand. This
is mainly because if they bid truthfully a zero payoff is guaranteed. They show in a multi-
unit discriminatory auction, it is an equilibrium for bidders to bid equal to the optimal bid
in a single unit first-price auction.
Some single-unit auctions allow bidders to submit joint bids in sealed-bid auctions be-
cause it facilitates information sharing, reduces the risk of winners’ curse and increases
bidder aggressiveness. It can also reduce the number of bidders, which reduces compe-
tition, aggressiveness and revenues. However, as long as the first effect outweighs the
second then joint bidding can increase revenue. Levin (2004) recognises that when joint
bidding is extended to multi-unit auctions a third effect occurs in which having fewer bid-
ders encourages greater demand reduction as each bidding group has more monopsony
power.
Holmberg (2009) and Anderson et al. (2013) are two studies that analyse the sup-
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ply function equilibria of the pay-as-bid (discriminatory) auction. Holmberg (2009) show
that in a case where cost function are non-decreasing there exist a single equilibrium for
the pay-as-bid auction. Anderson et al. (2013) consider the case where costs are com-
mon knowledge and demand is uncertain. Given that in this case a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium does not generally exist, they characterise the mixed strategy equilibrium in
discriminatory auctions.
3.3 Uniform versus discriminatory auctions
The two most common auctions used in practice are the uniform and discriminatory
auctions. The revenue ranking lists auction formats in terms of their expected revenue. The
overall consensus in the literature is that the revenue ranking between the two auctions is
ambiguous in general. However, different articles try to show different conditions under
which each auctions result in higher expected revenue.
Back and Zender (1993) shows the low price equilibria of the uniform-price auction
could result in the revenue supremacy of the discriminatory auction. Although the over-
all revenue ranking of the two auctions could be ambiguous because of the existence of
multiple equilibria, they suggest the low price equilibrium is Pareto optimal for buyers.
Therefore if buyers play their Pareto optimum strategies, then the discriminatory auction
could result in larger expected revenues.
Wang and Zender (2002) compare a uniform and discriminatory auction when a com-
mon value asset is risky, bidders are asymmetrically informed and submit a sealed bid
demand schedule. In the discriminatory auction, risk neutral bidders shade their bids and
submit a flat demand schedule. The auction generates revenue equal to the expected value
of the item. In contrast, a uniform-price auction generates the low revenue equilibria of
Back and Zender (1993) and has lower expected revenue than the discriminatory auction.
Wang and Zender (2002) show if bidders are risk averse and the supply is uncertain, then
bidders in the discriminatory auction submit downward sloping demand schedules and the
expected revenues are less than in the risk neutral case but are strictly greater than zero.
In the uniform-price auction, the expected revenue increases compared to the risk neutral
case and depends on the number of bidders, the degree of risk aversion, and the asset’s
expected value and variance. Depending on these variables it is possible for the uniform
auction to have higher expected revenue.
Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) consider the common value model where bidder marginal
valuations are endogenously determined. Players enter the auction holding either a long or
a short position in the underlying asset. After the auction, players may trade the good but
short players must close their position. The paper aims to model the market for treasury
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bills however the described market could also be relevant to the market for carbon permits
where firms surrender permits to offset their emissions on an annual basis. The model used
in Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) utilises a sealed-bid uniform-price auction where bidders
submit a bid schedule. After the auction, a long player is said to hold monopoly power if
the short players cannot close their position without purchasing units from the long player.
If there is no monopolist then the asset trades at the common value. If a long player holds a
monopoly position then they implement a squeeze and short players must purchase all the
units they need to cover their short for price. The more units a long player holds the more
likely they are to be able to implement a squeeze and so the marginal valuation schedule
for long players is upward sloping. In contrast, short players place a higher valuation on
their first units and less on later units so their marginal valuation schedules are downward
sloping.
Further Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) show in the uniform-price auction, the pure
strategy equilibrium is for short players to bid for the units they are short and for other
units. Long players cannot implement a squeeze, therefore bid for all units resulting in the
equilibrium price being and a squeeze does not occur. In discriminatory auctions, players
play mixed strategies and a squeeze occurs with positive probability. Short players bid
a price somewhere between and for the units they are short and for additional units. A
long player occasionally bids a price higher than for all units but most of the time bids for
all units. The discriminatory auction raises greater expected revenue but has higher price
volatility than the uniform price auction. The policy implication of the paper is when a
squeeze is possible the auction designer faces a choice between lower expected revenue
with lower price volatility or higher expected revenue and higher price volatility.
3.4 Eliminating low-price equilibria in uniform-price auctions
Revenue maximisation is one of the major goals of the seller in an auction. However,
the existence of low and possibly zero revenue equilibria in uniform-price auctions raised
several concerns for the researchers. Therefore, researchers have been motivated to in-
vestigate alternative auction rules that could possibly eliminate low-price equilibria. We
divide the literature into two major categories: first, those that study alternative allocation
rules, and second, those that study alternative supply adjustments.
3.4.1 Alternative allocation rules
For instance, Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) show that using an alternative allocation
rule can eliminate under-pricing and Kremer and Nyborg (2004b) show that restricting
bids to a finite number of price-quantity pairs can reduce under-pricing to an arbitrarily
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small amount.
Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) propose an alternative allocation rule to be used in auc-
tions where ties occur with positive probability. Typically, if there is excess demand at
the clearing price, bids above the clearing price are allocated in full and marginal bids
are rationed. Low-revenue equilibria occur because, in equilibrium, each bidder submits a
steep demand schedule and faces a steep residual supply curve. A bidder who increases his
marginal bid expects to pay more for all inframarginal units, but only expects to receive a
small number of additional marginal units. Consequently, it is not rational to deviate from
their steep demand schedule.
The alternative allocation rule suggested by Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) is a pro-rata
allocation of all bids that exceed the clearing price. It rewards aggressive marginal bids
because bidders can receive a higher proportion of all units, not just the marginal units.
When bidders are risk neutral, the unique equilibrium bidding strategy is to submit a flat
demand schedule with a price equal to the expected common value. Equilibrium bidding
strategies are independent of irrelevant demand/uncertain supply and expected revenue is
equal to the expected value. If bidders are risk averse and the value of the common good is
uncertain then using the alternative allocation rule reduces, but does not eliminate, under-
pricing. If bids are discrete and restricted to tick sizes then the clearing price may be
slightly lower but will be within where is the number of bidders and is the minimum price
tick.
Returning to a model where only marginal bids are rationed, Kremer and Nyborg
(2004b) find that under-pricing can be reduced by requiring bidders to submit a finite
number of price and quantity pairs. The model includes risk neutral bidders competing for
an uncertain supply of a perfectly divisible common value good with known value sold in
a uniform price auction. The bidders’ problem is to maximise their payoff, which is the
value of the good minus the price paid, multiplied by the fraction of the good won. As in
most real world auctions, bidders may only submit a finite number of price-quantity pairs.
The paper finds that the equilibrium price is equal to the common value almost surely.
The explanation for the finding is that once inframarginal bids are satisfied the residual
supply being competed for has positive mass and so a bidder can increase their payoff by
increasing their marginal bid negligibly. If bidders are restricted to tick sizes and quantity
multiples then under-pricing is bound by a function that is decreasing in the number of
bidders and the quantity multiple, and increasing in the tick size and quantity being sold.
Removing either the tick size or the quantity multiple will eliminate under-pricing. If there
is uncertainly in supply then under-pricing is eliminated. All results are robust to capacity
constrained bidders.
Kastl (2011) examines the same auction format as Kremer and Nyborg (2004b) but
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with bidders who each receive a private signal of the value of the good. The paper finds
that when bidders are restricted to a limited number of bids, bidders may find it optimal
to bid above their marginal valuation for some units. Consequently, the Vickrey auction
revenue is not the upper bound for uniform auction revenue. The rational is bidders face
a trade off between paying above their valuation for some units, if their bundle is the
marginal bid and they receive their full bundle, and receiving a greater number of higher
value inframarginal units in the case of rationing at the margin.
3.4.2 Alternative supply adjustments
In some of the previously examined models the quantity supplied was exogenously
determined and low-revenue equilibria existed. Some authors consider models where the
supply is no longer fixed and exogenous to see the effects on low-price equilibria. For
instance, Back and Zender (2001) consider a model where the seller chooses the quantity
supplied to maximise revenue after bids are submitted. LiCalzia and Pavan (2005) and
Khezr and MacKenzie (2018b) also examine models where the quantity supplied is de-
termined after bids are submitted, however, sellers pre-commit to a supply function. All
the papers found that allowing the quantity supplied to be endogenously determined can
eliminate low revenue equilibria.
Back and Zender (2001) show that if a seller has the right to decide about the quantity
of supply after bids are submitted then the equilibrium price will be significantly larger
compared to previously identified low-price equilibria. The intuition is that low-price
equilibria exist because bidders can submit lower demand curves and reduce competition
without changing the total number of units won. However, when the seller can reduce
supply ex-post to maximise revenue, any marginal demand reduction will be punished
by less supply and larger prices. Therefore, the incentives to reduce demands would be
significantly lower and in some cases close to zero.
LiCalzia and Pavan (2005) examines the case where the seller is required to pre-
commit to a supply curve and finds that an increasing supply function creates a positive
quantity effect that encourages price competition amongst bidders. The paper examines a
linear supply function and finds that for any reserve, common value and number of bidders
the seller can find a slope that eliminates under-pricing equilibria. When the supply is suf-
ficiently elastic the under-pricing equilibria are no longer self-enforcing. The paper finds
that neither a perfectly inelastic, nor a perfectly elastic supply curve is optimal and the
results are robust to an increasing supply. Damianov (2005) is another study that analyses
the uniform-price auction with endogenous supply. They show the low-price equilibria no
longer exist when the supply is endogenous. Also there exist an equilibrium in which the
Walrasian quantity and price is attained.
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McAdams (2007) also study a case when the auctioneer decides about the actual num-
ber of units to sell after the bids are submitted. McAdams (2007) suggests in this case
both the expected revenue and the social welfare could be higher than a case where the
auctioneer pre-commits to a fixed quantity of units.
Khezr and MacKenzie (2018b) model the supply using a step function where either a
low quantity or a high quantity is offered. There is a reserve price, below which no units
sell. The first step occurs between the reserve price and a trigger price which is a price
above which the extra units will be available. Their model of supply captures the effect of
the cost containment reserve used in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
auction for carbon permits. In their model bidders have common value for the goods.
However, they show the results are robust to a case of discrete private values. The auction
is a sealed-bid uniform-price auction where bidders submit a full demand schedule of price
quantity pairs and excess demand is rationed pro-rata on the margin. The paper finds it
is still possible that a low-price equilibrium exists where the common value is below the
trigger price. However, if the trigger price is chosen below the common value the low
revenue equilibrium may be replaced by a high price equilibrium where all the units are
sold at the trigger price. By using a step function the seller can gain greater revenues and
firms may have lower payoffs.
Khezr and MacKenzie (2018a) study a special supply regime motivated by the Cal-
ifornia’s market for emissions, where all players are endowed by fractions of total units
and must consign these units into the auction. They show there exist e class of equilibria
where firms are essentially indifferent between equilibrium prices since they will receive
their own endowed units.
4 Private values
This section reviews those articles that allow bidders to have private values for the
items being sold. Private valuations may be constant for additional units or diminishing
and players may be symmetric or asymmetric. Because bidders have different values for
the units, inefficient allocations may arise. The distributions of valuations are usually
common knowledge and known by all parties. This section will examine uniform-price
auctions with private values, discriminatory auctions with private values and will then
compare the two in terms of revenue and efficiency.
12
4.1 Uniform auctions with private values
In the common value setting low (including zero revenue) equilibria are possible be-
cause it is rational for bidders to submit symmetric steep downward sloping demand sched-
ules. Low revenue equilibria can also occur in the private value setting, however because
of asymmetric valuations, a bidder may choose to outbid other bidders rather than share
units.
Noussair (1995) considers a model where a fixed number of bidders are bidding for a
fixed number of units and each bidder has weakly diminishing values for two units. All
valuations are drawn from a common and known distribution and each bidder knows his
own valuations. Bidders submit sealed bids for two units and the uniform-price auction
uses the first-rejected-bid pricing rule. The paper finds that the dominant bidding strategy
for a bidder is to bid their value for the first unit and underbid for the second unit. The
bidders are symmetric and risk-neutral but because they have private values and shade
their bids differently across the first and second units inefficient allocations occurs with
positive probability.
The reason for the underbidding is the same as in the common value model. The bid
for subsequent units represents the trade off between winning more units and paying a
higher price for inframarginal units. Bidding the true value for the first unit is similar to
bidding ones value in a second-price single unit auction. It increases the probability you
win the unit at the price, but does not affect your payment. The bid for the second unit
influences both the probability of winning a second unit and the expected price paid for the
first unit. Bidders have an incentive to shade their second bid but do not have an incentive
to shade their first bid.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) uses the same auction model as Noussair (1995)
and assumes that there aren’t enough goods for all bidders to receive two units and that
probability of ties is zero. The paper defines necessary conditions for pooling equilibria
and raises the possibility of a zero-revenue equilibrium in which all bidders win at least
one unit. This equilibrium exists even if one bidder’s second valuation exceeded another
bidder’s first valuation meaning that in equilibrium allocations are inefficient. The ex-
istence of multiple equilibria, low-revenue equilibria and inefficient equilibria arises not
because multiple units are being sold, but because bidders demand multiple units.2
Ausubel and Cramton (1995) study the uniform-price auction with interdependent val-
ues. They show in a flat demand setting the uniform-price auction is always inefficient.
The only exception is a case where bidders are symmetric with similar capacities and the
total capacity divided by individual capacity is an integer. Further they extend the model
2Khezr and Menezes (2017) provide an alternative characterisation of the bidding function that applies
to Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) models.
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to a case with downward sloping demand and show the uniform-price continues to result
in inefficient allocation of goods.
4.2 Discriminatory auctions with private values
In the discriminatory auction, bidders pay their bid for each item they buy and winning
a marginal unit does not affect the price paid for inframarginal units. Bid shading can oc-
cur for every unit because bidders are motivated to make a surplus on the items they win.
Ausubel and Cramton (1995) show that risk-neutral bidders who have flat marginal valua-
tions submit flat bid strategies, but when marginal valuations are decreasing bid shading is
greater for higher value items; resulting in a bid schedule that is flatter than the marginal
valuation schedule. The paper finds that if bidders’ valuations are interdependent and
capacities are asymmetric, in general, discriminatory auctions are not efficient.
McAdams (2006) characterises monotone pure-strategy equilibrium of the discrimina-
tory and the uniform-price auction with bidders that have multi-dimensional independent
types and interdependent values. They show all mixed strategy equilibria have similar
interim expected payment as well as ex post similar allocation as the pure-strategy equi-
librium.
Anwar (2007) extends the result in Milgrom and Weber (1982) to a case of discrimi-
natory auction with multi-units. In a two-bidder constant marginal valuations model, they
show that there exists a unique equilibrium for the discriminatory auction that corresponds
to the result in Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the single-unit first price auction.
4.3 Uniform-prices versus discriminatory auction
Ausubel and Cramton (1995) show that the revenue and efficiency rankings of the
uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey auctions are in general ambiguous because they de-
pend on the distributions of bidder valuations. In the case with flat demand and capac-
ity constrained bidders, the Vickrey auction is efficient and revenue superior to the other
two formats. Further, the uniform-price and the discriminatory auctions are not efficient
and their revenue ranking is ambiguous. Additionally, when bidders’ marginal values are
smoothly decreasing, setting an optimal reserve price can increase revenue but there is
a conflict between revenue maximisation and efficiency. Ausubel et al. (2014) builds on
Ausubel and Cramton (1995) and presents a detailed comparison of the uniform-price and
discriminatory auctions.
Tenorio (1999) shows there is no strong revenue equivalence theory for multi-unit
auctions because the different auction formats result in different allocations. A weaker
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revenue equivalence concept exists that proposes that auctions which have the same equi-
librium quantity profiles have the same expected revenues.
Baisa and Burkett (2018) study a case where a large bidder with multi-unit demand
competes with many small bidders with single-unit demand. They show that the revenue
ranking of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions are ambiguous in general. How-
ever, the large bidder favours the discriminatory auction. They also provide the conditions
such that small bidders prefer the uniform-price auction.
4.4 Eliminating low-revenue equilibria in private value uniform auc-
tions
Bresky (2013) uses the same two-unit demand model as Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn (1998) with symmetric risk-neutral bidders who have independent private values.
They find that increasing the reserve price slightly above zero will increase both revenue
and efficiency of the uniform-price auction. The paper considers two forms of inefficiency:
‘misallocation efficiency’ which occurs when lower valuation bidders receive units and
the ‘supply restriction’ effect, which occurs when items fail to sell. A higher reserve price
reduces the probability of misallocation efficiency, but increases the probability of supply
restriction inefficiency. The two effects work in opposite directions, implying there is an
optimal reserve price. An optimal reserve price will reduce the amount of bid shading on
the second unit, prevent some inefficient allocations and increases the seller’s revenue.
Tenorio (1999) uses a two-bidder, three-unit model and finds that imposing a quantity
floor also increases expected revenue in a uniform price auction. In case bidders are re-
quired to bid for three units, they face full rationing and bid more aggressively compared
to the case when they only bid for two units and were only partially rationed. Tenorio
(1999) does not examine a more general case comparing two quantity floors that are both
smaller than the total supply.
Burkett and Woodward (2020) with a relatively general model of private values, show
that the undesirable properties of the uniform-price auction are closely related to the first
losing bid rule as the payment rule. They suggest the alternative last accepted bid pricing
rule results in an equilibrium that has relatively flat bids compared to the full information
case. The equilibrium bids are a generalisation of the bids in a first-price auction with
a single unit. Therefore price selection could be an additional tool to avoid undesirable
low-price equilibria of the uniform-price auction.
Khezr and Menezes (2020) show if only the marginal bidder pays a different price
than other bidders, then many zero-price equilibria of the uniform-price auction will be
eliminated. In particular, if the marginal bidder who sets the price for all units does not
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pay her own bid, but pays the second-highest losing bid, then zero-price equilibria of the
uniform-price would break because bidders who used to bid zero now have incentives to
raise their bids without the cost of raising their own equilibrium price.
5 The effect of resale on revenue
When items can be resold after an auction, there is a possibility that a bidder with a low
valuation, or even a pure speculator, increase their willing to pay because of an expectation
of reselling to a buyer with a higher valuation after the auction. Conversely, when a buyer
with a high valuation has demands for more than one unit, she may be willing to forgo the
opportunity to bid higher for some items in the auction to keep the auction price low. This
would result in paying less for the items she win in the auction and still have the chance
to buy the extra units demanded after the auction. For instance, Pagnozzi (2009) examines
the effects of resale and bundling in auctions and Pagnozzi (2010) examines the effects of
allowing resale in the presence of speculators. Both papers conclude that the distribution
of valuations is important to determine whether resale increases or decreases revenue.
Pagnozzi (2009) finds that allowing resale alone, or allowing bundling alone can have
an ambiguous effect on seller revenue, but combining the two is a complementary strat-
egy that can increase the seller’s revenue as long as the valuations of weaker bidders and
their bargaining power are not too much lower than the stronger bidder’s. The model is
a two-bidder, two-unit sealed bid auction. Each bidder has weakly diminishing marginal
values and valuations are common knowledge amongst the bidders. If a trade occurs in
the secondary market then gains from trade are shared in a pre-determined ratio.
Further Pagnozzi (2009) show that resale alone will reduce the seller’s revenue if bid-
ders have very different values and the strong bidder adopts an accommodation strategy
by reducing their willingness to outbid a low value bidder. For example, consider the
situation where a strong bidder values their second unit more than twice as much as a
weak bidder values their first unit. If resale is not allowed then a strong bidder will outbid
the weak bidder, but if resale is allowed then the goods will be split between the bidders
in a zero price equilibrium and the stronger bidder will buy their second unit from the
weaker bidder in the secondary market. If resale is inefficient (i.e. trades do not occur
with positive probability) then allowing resale alone can induce inefficient allocations. If
the no-resale equilibrium was a zero-revenue equilibrium then allowing resale does not
change the outcome.
Pagnozzi (2009) also show that bundling without resale can have an ambiguous effect
on revenue. Bundling without resale is equivalent to a single unit second-price auction
where the winner pays the sum of the losers’ valuations. If the unbundled equilibrium
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is a zero revenue equilibrium then bundling increases revenue. But if the bidders have
very different values and the stronger bidder would have outbid the weaker bidder in an
unbundled auction then the stronger player pays less in a bundled auction.
Combining bundling and resale can increase the seller’s revenue. Allowing resale in-
duces the weaker bidder to bid more aggressively and bundling prevents the stronger bid-
der participating in demand reduction. Pagnozzi (2009) concludes that if resale cannot
be prevented then the seller can increase revenue by bundling the units on sale. Overall,
if a seller is choosing between no bundling, bundling only, or bundling with resale, then
bundling with resale yields the higher revenue as long as bidders are not too asymmetric.
Pagnozzi (2010) extends the resale model to allow units and bidders with constant pri-
vate marginal valuations, which are common knowledge. The paper finds the dispersion
of bidder valuations is relevant to whether resale will increase or decrease revenue. The
paper includes speculators, which are bidders with zero value for the good but who may
wish to participate in bidding when there is a resale market. Bidders submit bids, there is
no reserve price and gains from resale are split equally. The paper finds that if bidders have
similar valuations (clustered values) then allowing resale increases revenue. Speculators
cause a competition effect during the bidding and allowing them to participate weakly in-
creases revenue. If the highest bidders value the good sufficiently more than other bidders
(dispersed top values) then allowing resale induces accommodating behaviour and reduces
revenue.
6 Other multi-unit auctions
In this Section we introduce two more commonly known types of multi-unit auctions.
First is a dynamic open ascending auction that results in truthful bidding and efficient
allocation of units. Second, we discuss the generalized second-price auction which has
been used for the allocation of online advertisement spots.
6.1 Ausubel auction
Ausubel (2004) introduces a dynamic auction which is now commonly known as the
Ausubel auction. In the Ausubel auction the auctioneer announces a low price and bidders
indicate how many units they want at that price. The auctioneer continuously raises the
price until the residual demand faced by a bidder is less than the total supply. When
this happens the bidder is said to have ‘clinched’ an item and is awarded the item at that
price. The auction continues until all units are awarded to bidders. The price paid by the
winner is independent of their bid and so the mechanism induces sincere bidding. In a
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model of pure private values, the dynamic auction results in the same outcome as the static
Vickrey auction, but if there are affiliated or common values and private information then
the information sharing aspect of the Ausubel auction increases revenue and efficiency
because it reduces the generalised winners’ curse.
If bidders in the Ausubel auction have budget constraints, the allocation process can
relax binding budget constrains and be more efficient than the static Vickrey auction, how-
ever, overall the effect is ambiguous (Ausubel, 2004). Perry and Reny (2005) propose a
variation to the Ausubel auction where bidders may submit different quantity bids against
different bidders at each price. The alternative designs facilitates information discovery
when bidders are heterogeneous and valuations are interdependent.
6.2 Generalized second-price auction
Edelman et al. (2007) is a preliminary study that analyses a new format of multi-unit
auctions which is called the generalized second price auction. The generalised second
price auction is a relatively new format which has been used for the auctions that allocate
online advertisement spots. The auction has a similar payment rule to the single unit
second-price auction, however with one major difference. There are more than one units
available. Thus each winning bidder pays the next highest bid. Edelman et al. (2007)
show that unlike the Vickrey auction, the generalized second price auction does not result
in truthful bidding and does not have a dominant strategy equilibrium.
7 Conclusions and future works
This paper summarised the main theoretical results for multi-unit auctions. It has
largely focused on uniform and discriminatory auctions and found that in general these
two popular auction formats are not efficient. Additionally, their revenue rankings are
ambiguous and require empirical research. In many circumstances uniform auctions ad-
mit seemingly collusive low or zero revenue equilibriums, however, endogenously varying
supply or restricting bidders to thick and quantity increments can eliminate them.
Given the importance of these auctions in real-world markets the need for further the-
oretical research is evident. The main gap in the literature is with regards to the models
where bidders have both private and diminishing marginal values for units. Although there
may be several technical difficulties for studying such models, they could provide the best
representation of real-world situations in some markets.
Furthermore, note that the main reason for popularity of the uniform-price and the
discriminatory auctions is the simplicity of the payment rule. Uniform pricing has the
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advantage of price discovery as well. Therefore, further studies that can provide alternative
allocation rules or supply adjustments are essential to improve the performance of these
two auction by keeping their advantages.
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